Objective Morals
Reason number one offered by Sideras in support of concluding that God exists is the existence of objective morals. Much debate surrounds this topic. Do objective morals exist? Most theists, and especially Christian theists, answer in the affirmative. What does this actually mean? Morality seems inextricably connected to subjects in ways that other objective things like truth are not. This seems to account, at least in part, for why there is such disagreement over the nature of morality.
We know what it means for a proposition to be objectively true. We might say something like: a proposition 
is true if and only if there is a corresponding state of affairs 
of which is about and obtains. Like any fundamental issues in philosophy there is even controversy over the appropriate way to define truth, but the key takeaway here is that the truth or falsity of is independent of what any subject believes about . In fact, it is independent of belief all together.
With this in mind, objective morals existing could mean something like: there are facts regarding morals. If so, then meaningful propositions can be formed that have definite truth values. For example, Sideras agrees that “It is wrong to murder” is a true moral proposition. Both theists and non-theists can be moral realists, but they disagree as to the truth makers of moral propositions.
However, not all non-theists are moral realists. Some will take issue with thinking there are such things as moral propositions. Such a person will challenge the existential claim made by Sideras, which, if successful, would undercut belief in God by removing the reason offered. So, there are two approaches to consider. One is to agree with Sideras that objective morals exist, but show that such existence does not require God. The second is to deny that such things as objective morals exist. Let’s consider each possibility as a response to the moral argument.
The Argument
Sideras refers to the moral argument, which I will formulate as follows:
- Objective morals (and duties) do exist.
- If objective morals (and duties) exist, then God exists.
- Therefore, God does exist.
The way Sideras phrases the argument is slightly different, but logically equivalent to this formulation. So stated, it is a deductively valid argument of the Modus Ponens variety. Its formal structure would be
Because the argument is valid, one can really only challenge the premises. If one denies the first premise, then one means to affirm that objective morals and duties do not exist. If one denies premise two, then one supports the negation that objective morals do exist, but God does not. However, one need not take such a strong counter position. All that really needs to be shown, at least here, is that one is under no obligation to agree to the premises.
Premise One
Let’s start with the reasons Sideras takes premise one to be true. Are they good enough to compel acceptance? He starts by saying
People commonly regard telling the truth as right and murder as wrong, … kindness is good and torturing children is evil.
Sideras also appeals to the fact that certain virtues seem to be affirmed in all cultures, which he thinks implies a universal moral law within our conscience. But is this a good reason to think that morals are objective? It seems clear that a moral skeptic still has a lot of room to escape Sideras’ claim. After all, one need only affirm that humans are sufficiently similar and therefore value and disvalue broadly similar characteristics, which leads to broadly homogeneous preferences amongst individuals. At best Sideras seems to be appealing to our intuition, but intuition can and has been wrong.
Premise Two
Many people don’t feel the need to deny premise one. Moral realism does seem plausible. Our intuition really is tracking something objective about reality, but does this really require the existence of God? Why think that the existence of moral facts implies the existence of God? What connection is there supposed to be be between moral facts obtaining and God existing?
Sideras seems to think that God is the truth maker of moral propositions. Since moral facts are normative in nature, they require a “law-giver”. So murder is wrong is a true proposition just in case God exists to command that one not do such a thing as murder. And if one inquires as to why God would bother commanding such a thing, the common recourse seems to be that such a thing runs counter to God’s nature. Why that should be true is left unexplained.
Is this the only way to get moral facts? It seems not. And if not, then that seems to leave us with no reason to accept premise two. For instance, a non-theist could take moral facts as primitive. This may not be entirely satisfying, but it seems more simple, than adding in a mysterious transcendent entity who commands based on a nature that has to be taken as primitive.
Another more simple theory would take the wrong or right makers of actions to be properties inherent to actions themselves with respect to appropriate agents. This seems to be how people understand morality anyway. Most people don’t reason or perceive that mistreating a person is wrong because there just has to be a transcendent being who commands against such things. Rather, most people reason that wrongness comes from the effects actions have and the fact that we ourselves wouldn’t want to be recipient to such behavior from others.
A Possible Response
Sideras anticipates to some extent the reply given to premise two, but he doesn’t go much further than to merely assert that no valid naturalistic alternative exists for the objective source of morals. Understandably, Sideras is only giving a cursory look at this matter (there are, after all, 101 reasons to get through in a reasonable space), but the passing dismissal still seems unforgivable. He does take a jab at evolution as inadequate to explain morals, but this misses the mark, since evolution is a theory about the diversity of life, not the nature of morality. Perhaps Sideras will agree with this, but insist that evolution is inconsistent with objective morality. He suggests as much by pointing out that natural selection is about survival, which often conflicts with moral maxims. But the non-theist need not worry about this, since natural selection is descriptive, not normative.
Conclusion
As it stands, appealing to objective morals doesn’t seem to be a particularly good reason to conclude that God exists. We’ve seen that no relevant data brought up by Sideras is even significantly probative of the existence of objective morals. Yet, conceding as much doesn’t plausibly require one to agree that God is required either. Perhaps more could be brought to bear on the matter that could change the analysis, but the status of the issue doesn’t appear to favor theism over non-theism.