Oxford philosophy student Josh Parikh joins Justin Schieber to discuss Josh’s rejection of a key premise in Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument (previously discussed in RA004). The premise, which states that there do in fact exist persons who are non-resistantly in a state of non-belief about God’s existence, is largely taken to be true by most philosophers of religion.
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Schellenberg’s premise, regarding nonresistant nonbelief, says, “There is at least one capable finite person S and time t such that S is or was at t nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists.”
I don’t actually see this premise as controversial because it says there is (or) has been at least one instance of nonresistant nonbelief. That could be for one minute or for one second. So, it’s a REALLY modest premise.