Hell, No! Part 1

Introduction

Despite being a non-Christian for many years now, there are certain theological topics that continue to be of great interest to me. At the top of the list is the doctrine of Hell. Many people fear Hell, and who could blame them? No one really knows what, if anything, happens when we die, and the thought that it could be a terrifying state of suffering leaves many unsettled. This is not just some random worry, either. Many cultures and religions have held that there must be some kind of nightmarish afterlife, at least for those deemed “bad”, “unworthy”, or “unsaved”. 

I grew up believing this as part of the standard evangelical framework. I even defended the doctrine of eternal Hell while in Bible college. But after studious reflection, I think the best explanation for belief in Hell lies in evolutionary reasons related to our natural desire to see wrongdoers punished, as opposed to any reasons related to scripture, tradition, or perfect being theology.

While somewhat understandable, I am convinced it is a harmful doctrine that can cause lasting trauma. This is supported by many testimonies, including my own. As a child, the thought of being tormented forever caused great anxiety, a residue of which remains to this day. Many who hold to these beliefs would say that such anxiety is good and functions as a warning, perhaps from God “Himself”. However, my rational side has come to recognize that such worries cannot be well founded given the existence of a perfect being such as God. Eternal Hell and God are simply incompatible- the truth of one will exclude the reality of the other, or so I will argue. 

The motivation for this particular post arose after reading an article entitled “How Much Punishment Is Enough”, by Al Serrato for CrossExamined, the flagship ministry of popular apologist Frank Turek. Serrato specifically has a law degree, which makes his take on this issue somewhat more interesting than the average apologist’s. Ironically, his strictly judicial mindset may just be the most important shortcoming of his case. 

Serrato divides his case up into five sections. This is a deep topic and there is a lot to say about each issue he brings up. So, to prevent this post from becoming far too long, I will address each section separately. In this first of several posts, I will respond to his section titled “Who Is the Crime Against?”. 

Definitions and Terminology 

Before evaluating Serrato’s justifications for Hell, we need to make clear the central concepts being discussed. Terminology matters. And while “Hell” and “God” are common parlance, what people mean by these terms admits of wide variations. The least ambiguous term, here, is “God”. When I use the term “God”, I intend an unsurpassably great being who is worthy of worship. This arguably entails having such attributes as omnipotence, omniscience, perfect love, and perfect justice. These are generally part of a core class of attributes that feature in most theist’s conception of God. Whether or not this description applies to the being depicted in the Bible, it is safe to say that individuals like Serrato think it does apply. Such a view is by no means idiosyncratic.

As for Hell, there is far greater variation. People differ on whether Hell is a literal place or some kind of state of being. They also differ on what Hell consists in. Some adopt Dantean views of Hell as a place of literal fire and tortures of various unfathomable kinds. Others see it as an absence of or separation from all that is good. People even disagree on the duration and final outcome. 

In spite of such variety, there are roughly three broad views on Hell:

• Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT) (aka the traditional view). This category includes any view of Hell where the unsaved suffer forever. William Lane Craig and Frank Turek are popular purveyors of this view, along with most other apologists. It is also the view most commonly adopted by big name evangelical preachers like Paul Washer and John MacArthur. 
• Annihilation (aka conditional immortality). This covers any view where the unsaved are removed from existence (whether sooner or later). Apologist Randal Rauser is a more well known proponent of this view. 
• Universalism. This includes any view positing that all humans will, at least eventually, be saved. If Hell exists, it is temporary and serves corrective and rehabilitative purposes. Perhaps the most well known theologian supporting this view is David Bentley Hart. Christian philosophers Josh Rasmussen, Eric Reitan, and John Kronen also subscribe to this view. 

Given that Serrato is guest writing for Turek’s ministry, it isn’t surprising that he too argues in favor of ECT. Thus, when I use the term “Hell”, it is ECT I have in mind. And when I say God and Hell are incompatible, I mean that if God exists, then there is no eternal conscious torment for any individual person. 

The Premise

Serrato frames his piece as a response to the common and correct charge that Hell is unjust in virtue of an extreme disproportionality between crime and punishment. He thinks such a conclusion rests on a misunderstanding of what just punishment entails. To make his case, Serrato leads us through several points of consideration. The first, and focus of this response, is a consideration of who a crime is against. 

Consideration One: Who is the crime against?

I mentioned above that Serrato has a law degree, and it shows in his writing. He views morality in almost exclusively legal terms, which leads me to believe that he very likely subscribes to some form of divine command theory (DCT). Beyond the critical problems with DCT, I will show that Serrato’s overly legal framework is actually a weakness. 

He begins by asking us to consider the nature of the sovereign against whom our crimes are committed. I agree that this is an important question, but not for the same reasons as Serrato. In fact, it is precisely this nature that rules out something like ECT. But we’ll turn to that in moment. 

To set the stage, Serrato introduces what I take to be a bizarre and unclear analogy. It’s perhaps best to quote it in full.

“If I commit a crime in California, state authorities in Colorado could not impose punishment. Their laws have not been broken. To be just, the laws of the sovereign should be made known. Although ignorance of the law is not an excuse, a fair system makes known its laws, so that they can have the intended effect: to shape behavior by encouraging the good and discouraging the bad. State authorities are by nature limited and flawed, and the laws they enact reflect that they cannot, and therefore do not, expect perfection.”

https://crossexamined.org/how-much-punishment-is-enough/

In all honesty, I’m not entirely sure what the point of this analogy is. But one thing we can agree on is the principle that a just and fair system makes its laws known. I would only add that this should be done in a clear and unambiguous way. But now there is a serious problem. Has this been done? No doubt Serrato thinks so. After all, it’s all laid out in the Bible. But hold on. This assumes (1) we know the Bible to be the definitive “law of the land” and (2) that the Bible is clear and unambiguous. 

Unfortunately, the Bible is but one amongst many systems claiming to be the “law”. Worse than that, there is even considerable debate over whether there is a cosmic sovereign at all. Worse still, even amongst those who agree that the Bible supplies the law of the sovereign, there is no consensus on what it actually says. People spend years in seminary and theological institutions yet still come away with significantly different views and interpretations. As outlined in the introduction, this includes considerable disagreement over the nature of Hell itself. Is this really what we would expect from a perfect being? By my lights, the answer is an unambiguous no. On perfect being theism we have good reasons to expect little confusion with respect to such important matters. On naturalism, such confusion is no surprise at all. This datum therefore counts in favor of naturalism over perfect being theism.

So, rather than being in a specific place like California or Colorado, our situation is more analogous to living in an area where various groups make different and incompatible claims about who or what, if anything, governs the area and what the laws, if any, there are. This would not be indicative of a fair and just system. Likewise, we would not expect a perfect being to leave people so confused. It is not enough that the correct and official laws be “out there”. They must be recognizable as such if we are to judge the sovereign as fair and just. 

Problems like this are the basis of various arguments against the existence of God. Philosopher Theodore Drange, for instance, has developed several such arguments with respect to confusion and biblical defects. These issues are also closely related to the argument from Divine Hiddenness, most notably championed by philosopher J. L. Schellenberg. 

A Problematic Inference

Serrato seems to make something like the following inference:

State authorities are by nature limited and flawed. Therefore, state authorities cannot expect perfection. 

Perhaps this is based on something like the following general principle:

If an authority is limited and flawed by nature, then that authority cannot expect perfection from those under its authority. 

How are we to understand such a principle? It’s not entirely clear what is meant by “limited” and “flawed” or by expecting perfection. It seems to be part of the very nature of a law to “expect” perfection. You either live up to it or you do not. But perhaps he means that the authority itself is to some extent lenient with regard to meting out punishments for falling short of perfect law abidance. We see this with speed limit laws, which are nearly impossible to obey precisely. Everyone will go over the speed limit even by just a little through the course of normal driving. Fluctuations in speed due to various factors are simply beyond our ability to so finely control to ensure that we never broach the stated limit. Because of this, police officers largely show some measure of leniency.

Now we have a crucial question: is perfection not expected because of the nature of the authority or is it because of the nature of those under the authority? I contend it is the latter. In the example of speed limits, officers are lenient not so much because they are limited and flawed, but because they recognize that people simply can’t be perfect at driving a precise speed all the time. The only role of their own flaws and limitations is in helping them directly understand this inability. Would anything change if police officers magically gained the ability to never go above any posted speed limit? I don’t think so. Why should expectations increase just because the authority has abilities those under the authority lack through no fault of their own? Parents are far superior to their small children at many things, but they don’t, on account of that, expect perfection from them. 

Serrato explicitly makes this mistake. Following his analogy he asks the following loaded question: “But who is the lawmaker that can sentence us to this ‘eternal’ punishment?”. This assumes there is someone who can justly sentence us to such a fate. According to Serrato, God can because God is perfect. This appears to clearly commit the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Such a fallacy is quite common and occurs when someone argues in the following manner:

• If , then
• Not
• Therefore, not

In Serrato’s case, this looks as follows

• If an authority is limited and flawed by nature, then that authority cannot expect perfection from those under its authority. 
• God is not limited or flawed by nature.
• Therefore, God can expect perfection from those under “His” authority. 

This is an invalid argument and so the conclusion does not follow. 

What Does Perfection Demand?

But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that if any being may demand or expect perfection, it is one that is itself perfect. What follows from this? Certainly nothing about what sorts of punishments are appropriate for failing to be perfect. Yet, Serrato seems to assume as much by asking not about who may demand perfection, but about who may sentence us to eternal damnation. He says a perfect being may do just that. But why? He attempts to answer this by appealing to two claims:

1. All people live eternally.
2. God, the source of perfection and goodness, permanently separates “Himself” from the damned. 

The combined state of living eternally separated from God just is Hell on Serrato’s view. One eternally suffers as an effect of separation from all that is good. This yields insight into Serrato’s picture of Hell, but, unfortunately, we are no closer to understanding how or why this is just. On what grounds should anyone accept (1) or (2) above? Even if we grant Christian theism, (1) is not a given. Recall that one of the main views of Hell is conditional immortality. Further, many Christians take existence itself to be a good. Thus, to truly be separated from all that is good would be to not exist. So Serrato’s view seems to require that he adopt annihilation.

With regard to (2), there are a few problems. First, what would motivate God to permanently separate “Himself” from “His” image bearers? This means complete and total abandonment. Is this really compatible with perfect love? What would this accomplish? It certainly wouldn’t teach the person anything or allow them to change. It could only function as pure retribution, pain for its own sake. Such motivations are inconsistent with a perfectly good and loving God.

The likely reply is that God is motivated by justice, which brings us to the second problem: how is this just? The best we get is an assertion: “That [God] would separate himself from a creation in rebellion is hardly unjust.” Given that God is the very source of all that is good and the only means by which anyone can be ultimately fulfilled, it isn’t clear that this is true. In what way can rebellion be quelled in an absence of goodness? This form of “justice” isn’t compatible with God’s perfect love. Only restorative, or forward-looking, justice allows for God to be both perfectly just, perfectly loving, and perfectly merciful. 

A third problem is that (2) is far from clear. In what sense is creation “in rebellion”? Rebellion suggests a conscious and willful resistance to an authority. Is Sterrato suggesting that all non-Christians actually do recognize the truth of the Bible, but purposefully pretend to adhere to something else? If so, that would be absurdly implausible. There are still unreached tribes in the world. Are we to believe that they have any inkling of the truth of the Bible, even from “general revelation”? Are we to believe that Muslim extremists willing to sacrifice themselves are just pretending? Are atheists really so irrationally hedonistic that they see never ending suffering as outweighed by a finite life of mediocre pleasures?

In response, I suspect Serrato would appeal to Romans 1, claiming that people, even subconsciously, “suppress the truth in unrighteousness”. This is barely more plausible and arguably even a complete misunderstanding of the passage. Christian philosopher and apologist Randal Rauser makes a good case against appealing to Romans 1, at least with respect to atheists, in his book, Is The Atheist My Neighbor. However, I think his case can be extended to show that Romans 1 is also not a good explanation of the diversity of religious beliefs we observe in the world.

But suppose we grant that non-saved humanity participates in some level of rebellion. Even if some measure of separation is warranted, why permanent separation? We can certainly envision scenarios wherein a loving parent relationally distances themself from a rebellious child. But this is usually due to practical concerns. The parent has no recourse but to let the child “learn the hard way”. However, such parents, in their love, still remain open to that hope of reconciliation. And how much more would this be true of God who would be love personified?

Conclusion

This, then, is one of the key failures of Serrato’s approach. As I mentioned at the beginning, he seems to view everything in purely legal terms. But legal systems and sovereigns don’t generally care about those subject to the system, at least, not in virtue of the system. A personal/relational (as well as ethical) element is missing that seems essential to a being like God. It leaves out the moral value of love. Serrato, in what can only be described as the legalistic language of the old testament, has sacrificed Divine Love on the alter of an impersonal, uncaring judicial force – A force wholly foreign to all that is good about Christianity.

For this reason, the parent-child relation is far more analogous to God’s relation to us than is a legal sovereign-governed relation. Loving parents care about what is in their children’s best interests. A loving core directs justice towards teaching, correction, and restoration. It does not abandon. This is especially true given the vast differential in moral maturity between parent and child. In the case of God, that gulf would be essentially infinite. A perfectly loving and perfectly rational being would take such things into account, and through freedom preserving methods, would guide the beloved toward the good. Finite humans may not always have the resources to accomplish this, but God’s resources would be unlimited. We should therefore expect none to be lost if God exists.

I contend, therefore, that a true consideration of who our crimes are (or would be) against, if it be God, leads us not to ECT, but to some form of universalism. Only universalism allows for God to meaningfully have all the attributes typically ascribed to “Him”.